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1 The book and a few commentaries
Richard Healey’s Gauging What’s Real is something not frequently seen on the
landscape of philosophy of physics. It is not a book about the interpretation of
quantum mechanics or quantum field theory, nor is it about space and time or
causality. Rather it focuses on the conceptual foundations of specific theories of
interaction, namely gauge theories of the Yang-Mills (YM) type (including elec-
trodynamics). 1 Since three of the four fundamental interactions are modelled by
theories of this kind, the importance of the subject is obvious for the elaboration of
a scientific image of interaction. The book aims at a delicate balance of readability
while being exhaustive. Most subjects already present in the philosophical litera-
ture are discussed, even if it is sometimes briefly. Healey takes remarkable steps to
make his book accessible to a large community of researchers. For example there
are no less than six pedagogical appendixes. Not surprisingly, in this context many
questions would require a much more detailed discussion to satisfy the specialist.
Email address: alexandre.guay@gmail.com (Alexandre Guay).
1 On many occasions Healey makes valuable points about General Relativity, another
gauge theory. But GR is obviously not his main target. Most of the time comments are
made in order to contrast GR with Yang-Mills theories. In this review I discuss only YM
theories.
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But as Healey says himself: “[T]he book does not represent the last word - or even
my last word - on this topic . . . If I have conveyed a sense of its intellectual inter-
est and importance, while provoking some reader to do a better job, then I will be
satisfied” (p. x). The relative rarity of books about fundamental interaction theories
gives us more than enough reason to forgive some too short discussions.
The introductory chapter presents, among other things, the principal fibre bundle
formalism. This geometrical framework is the main conceptual item in Healey’s
toolbox when discussing classical YM theories. It is obviously an especially ap-
propriate tool in this context. After this first chapter follow three chapters focusing
mostly on classical YM theories. The first of these is about the Aharonov-Bohm
(AB) effect, a quantum phenomenon predicted by a model of quantized charged
particles subjected to the influence of a classical electromagnetic gauge potential.
The importance of the AB effect should not be underestimated. In the philosophi-
cal literature it is clearly one of the main empirical reasons to reconsider the usual
field ontology of classical electromagnetism. Moreover, even if it is a quantum ef-
fect, it has a significant impact on the interpretation of classical YM theories. The
model of a quantized charged particle (for example represented by a wave func-
tion) subjected to a classical gauge potential can be modelled by a U(1) principal
fibre bundle. This geometrical construction is also the natural setting to represent
the classical U(1) YM theory (the classical theory associated with quantum elec-
trodynamics). Therefore an interpretation of the AB effect can possibly be trans-
posed to the U(1) YM theory and vice versa. Moreover a convincing interpretation
of the U(1) YM theory can serve as a foundation for interpreting classical non-
Abelian YM theories. About the AB effect, Healey proposes three interpretations,
each transposable as an ontological interpretation of all classical YM interaction:
(1) no new electromagnetic properties view (for YM theories, no gauge potential
properties view), (2) new localized electromagnetic properties view (new localized
gauge properties), and (3) new non-localized electromagnetic properties view (non-
localized gauge potential properties view). For the AB effect, and for classical YM
theories in general, Healey supports the third position.
Healey’s main argument against the first position is that it seems to bring back
action at a distance, ostensibly a bad thing, to field theory (see the next section
for a discussion about this point). But also it seems that in non-Abelian theories
there may be physically distinct situations in a region even though the gauge field
is the same throughout the region in each situation. New properties seem needed
to distinguish these situations. Since there is no empirical application of a non-
Abelian classical YM theory, this argument relies on a certain interpretation of the
mathematical formalism that could be contested.
In the recent literature numerous philosophers defend one version or another of the
second position, for example (Leeds, 1999) and (Maudlin, 1998). Most of Healey’s
attacks on this position consist in reframing these positions in the formalism of the
principal fibre bundle. If this geometrical formalism represents adequately classi-
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cal YM theories (and we have no reason to believe the contrary), it excludes the
possibility of localized gauge properties. For a recent enlightening analysis of the
ontological implications of the principal fibre bundle formalism, see (Catren, 2008).
So it seems we are left with the third position. One of the more interesting theses
of Healey’s book is that the new non-localized gauge properties are captured by
holonomies in the appropriate principal fibre bundle. Thus, the holonomy interpre-
tation of classical YM theory asserts that the theory represents intrinsic holonomy
properties of regions of space-time, each of which consists of all points on a loop. If
this interpretation is correct, the main metaphysical consequence is the unavoidable
non-separability of physical processes in classical physics.
Healey answers many objections to the holonomy interpretation but some questions
remain:
(1) Holonomy is not the unique way to characterize the non-localized gauge prop-
erties. Other representations can be formulated. For example, if the asymptotic
boundaries are empty Minkowskian we can use, as variables, gauge invari-
ant line integrals coming from infinity. For other boundary conditions other
choices are possible. Does this freedom in representation have an impact on
the ontological conclusions?
(2) Holonomies for non-Abelian principal fibre bundle are not gauge invariant. As
Healey explains, for holonomies to capture intrinsic properties of a principal
bundle, one or more reference points in a particular fibre have to be chosen.
The apparent space-time realism implied by the introduction of loops and ref-
erence points in the interaction ontology could be problematic if we aim, like
many physicists, for a background free theory. The fact that the paradigmatic
example of a locally defined entity, the matter field, cannot be considered re-
alistically since it is not gauge invariant inclines us to look with suspicion on
an interpretation relying on a realist position about space-time points.
(3) Knowing all this, are holonomies the appropriate variables to identify gauge
orbits in the space of histories of the theory (presumably the physical vari-
ables)? Should we not look for a way to identify gauge orbits that involve, in
a transparent way, matter degrees of freedom?
This said, even if we are suspicious about the loop interpretation, this does not in
any way diminish Healey’s claim about the fact that classical YM theories involve
a non-localized interaction process. This is a significant assertion.
Then second half of Healey’s book concentrates on quantum YM theories. Healey
discusses an impressive number of subjects that often are presented for the first
or almost for the first time in the philosophical literature. Not surprisingly many
sections feel too compact. Let us briefly expose the main content of each chapter.
The fifth chapter is an introduction to the quantization of YM theories, mainly YM
free field theories. This chapter is a good introduction but does not allow the reader
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to grasp all the complexity and the subtleties involved in the quantization of a gauge
theory. For example, the fact that the BRST symmetry is not discussed when ghost
fields are introduced is a weakness. Also, only two pages are devoted to theories
with interacting terms with matter fields. This is unfortunate since one of the great
strength of Healey’s analysis of classical YM theories is that it does not loose sight
of matter fields. In fact this is one of the advantages of using the principal fibre
bundle formalism in which matter fields are easily represented.
Chapter six is a defence of the formal character of gauge symmetry. Familiar ap-
proaches to this question are extensively discussed, like the possible observation of
gauge transformations and the empirical implication of the gauge argument. More
interestingly, much less discussed approaches are exposed and criticized: the em-
pirical status of ghost fields, the possible gauge dependence of the spontaneous
gauge symmetry-breaking, the possible empirical distinction between large and
small gauge transformations and finally the status of anomalies. In each case Healey
argues in a compact way against the position that gauge symmetry is empirical.
The seventh chapter is an introduction to what a gauge reduced quantum YM theory
would look like. The version the author is presenting is based on a loop representa-
tion of the YM fields. Healey forthrightly does not hide the problems encountered
by this representation, especially when interaction with a matter field is included.
Nevertheless, the potential significance of such representation is not to be under-
estimated. Philosophers, as Healey is rightly pleading, should take a particular in-
terest in this area of research since these representations are presumably based on
physical—in other words, gauge invariant—variables.
YM quantum theories are models of the more general quantum field theory (QFT).
It is now a cliche´ to assert that the ontology implied by QFT is not obvious. Could
this problem be clarified if we focus on YM theories? The author explores briefly
this question in the eight and final chapter of the book, pushing his loop inter-
pretation in the framework of Bohm, Copenhagen and modal interpretations. This
chapter is not the strongest but it makes an interesting general point. Philosophers
of physics have the tendency to focus on the more general theories. Healey suggests
that specific theories, like YM theories, can give us a new perspective on interpre-
tative questions about quantum physics. This chapter could induce new research to
clarify this possibility. The remainder of the book consists in a concluding chapter,
asserting the importance of acknowledging the possibility of non-localized proper-
ties, and of six useful appendixes. The next section discusses in more details the
interpretation of the AB effect. The third section approaches the problem of the
language in which conceptual foundations questioning is taking place.
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2 The Aharonov-Bohm effect
Most of the discussions about the interpretation of the Aharonov-Bohm effect fol-
low a similar path. For example (Aharonov & Bohm, 1959), (Feynman et al., 1964),
(Healey, 1997) and (Belot, 1998). Schematically, (1) since there is an observable
effect (a phase shift in the interference pattern) on quantized charged particles,
something, let us call it X, must have acted on them. (2) X cannot be the elec-
tromagnetic field because charged particles cannot reach non-zero electromagnetic
field regions. Action at a distance is excluded. (3) Therefore new electromagnetic
properties (localized or not) have to be invoked to explain the effect. This is why the
AB effect is a pure quantum effect. (4) Furthermore, once new properties are be-
lieved to be necessary, in order to have a unified bearer of interaction, we interpret
all electromagnetic interaction as the result of these new properties. In consequence
the electromagnetic field becomes a derived entity.
First a remark about this common argument. A reader might worry about (2) be-
cause the localization of quantum particles is not a well defined concept. However
this proposition, already present in (Aharonov & Bohm, 1959), can be expressed
in a less problematic way. For example, in the Feynman functional quantization
method, the AB effect can be predicted without including in the sum over histories
any path crossing a region where the electromagnetic field is not zero. In conse-
quence the effect does not depend on a local interaction with Fµν but rather on
a relative phase shift between path contributions that depends on the electromag-
netic flux. Therefore no direct electromagnetic field interaction is involved in the
production of the AB effect. Now I would like to present an alternative, but comple-
mentary, line of reasoning that, to my knowledge, is absent from the philosophical
literature and from Healey’s book.
There are many ways to modify, with an electromagnetic field, an interference pat-
tern obtained by a two-slit scattering of charged particles. For example, (A) we can
introduce a enclosed magnetic flux between the slits. In this case we obtain a fringe
shift with respect to the unperturbed pattern, while the pattern envelope remains
the same. This is a case of the magnetic AB effect. Or (B) we could add a uni-
form magnetic or electric field behind the slits and then obtain a displacement of
the pattern without an envelope or relative phase change. Also (C) we could install
an electromagnetic source, like a light, behind the slits. If the source is sufficiently
intense, it can destroy the interference pattern. In this case the envelope and the pat-
tern become identified. We could imagine other examples, but these will suffice for
my purpose. The point is that only in cases B and C is a net change, caused by the
addition of an electromagnetic field, of average momentum and energy recorded.
In case A, momentum, energy and angular momentum are conserved as an average
(Olariu & Iovitzu Popescu, 1985). In B, a net transfer of transversal momentum
explains the displacement of the pattern. In C, the destruction of the interference
pattern implies a strong enough electromagnetic interaction in order for the charged
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particles to behave classically. Thus the AB effect is a pure quantum (beyond clas-
sical) effect because it is a measurable effect that does not require the transfer of a
physical quantity that we usually associate with classical interaction.
Before returning to the AB effect let us discuss briefly the ontological status of
the electromagnetic field in classical physics. The best reason we have to include a
field in our ontology is clearly provided by Einstein discussing the special theory
of relativity:
We now shall inquire into the insights of definite nature which physics owes
to the special theory of relativity. (I) There is no such thing as simultaneity of
distant events; consequently there is also no such thing as immediate action at
a distance in the sense of Newtonian mechanics. Although the introduction of
actions at a distance, which propagate with the speed of light, remains thinkable,
according to this theory, it appears unnatural; for in such a theory there could
be no such thing as a reasonable statement of the principle of conservation of
energy. It therefore appears unavoidable that physical reality must be described
in terms of continuous functions in space. (Einstein, 1970, p. 61)
For Einstein, some conservation principles are more fundamental than assumed on-
tology. Retarded action as a mode of electromagnetic interaction violates conser-
vation of energy and momentum (Lange, 2002, chapter 5). Furthermore, violation
of energy in this context entails a violation of determinism (Guay, 2004, chapter
5). The introduction in the theory ontology of the electromagnetic field solves all
these problems. On the other hand, since a non-zero gauge potential does not al-
ways carry energy it is not necessary to add this entity to the ontology. It would be
too strong to say that in classical physics to exist is to carry energy. Nevertheless,
to justify the introduction of a new entity to the ontology of a theory, a very strong
reason would be to save certain (local) conservation principles that we believe to
be essential. In the same way, action at a distance is rejected not because it is un-
thinkable but rather because it puts in danger the conservation principles of energy
and momentum.
How is this discussion in classical physics relevant to the interpretation of the quan-
tum AB effect? First, the AB effect is modelled as the influence of classical elec-
tromagnetism on quantized charged particles. The interaction is not theoretically
understood in a quantized way. Second, as already said, the AB setting is a model
of a U(1) principal fibre bundle, the geometrical setting of the U(1) classical YM
theory. In many aspects the AB effect is giving us information about classical in-
teraction in a semi-classical context. Authors like Belot (1998), Lyre (2004) and
Healey go as far to assert that the AB effect is a good base to discuss the ontology
of classical electromagnetism. Consequetly, in this context an Einsteinian ontolog-
ical approach is acceptable.
Since the AB effect does not imply a modification of average momentum or energy
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of particles, the necessity to reject action at a distance as a mean of interaction is
not clear in this case. Thus an electromagnetic interaction can take two forms:
• If there is a transfer of energy the bearer of the interaction is the electromagnetic
field. This entity is still necessary to guarantee the conservation principles even
in semi-classical contexts (Olariu & Iovitzu Popescu, 1985).
• If there is no average transfer of energy or momentum the interaction is me-
diated by a retarded action at a distance of Fµν (or possibly from the charges
themselves).
So there are two available stories. If your interaction concept implies some kind of
locality condition that excludes action at a distance, the AB effect justifies the addi-
tion of new gauge properties. If your concept of a bearer of interaction only implies
the local conservation of energy you have the option to not introduce new gauge
properties and resort to retarded action at a distance. I do not deny that the impo-
sition of a locality condition on interaction seems reasonable but I place the em-
phasis on the point that a locality condition on interaction which is not grounded in
the local conservation of energy is not naturalistic and therefore must be grounded
in some metaphysical conception of causality. Such a discussion is not present in
papers about gauge interaction.
3 The choice of a formal language
Face with the plurality of not clearly related problems discussed in the second half
of Healey’s book, it seems appropriate to long for a Carnap-style philosophical ap-
proach. By that I mean the reframing of the different problems and questions in the
same ideal language that allow clear identification of their relations, to expose and
eliminate pseudo-problems, and to give tools to transpose interpretative solutions
from one theory to another. In fact, for quantum YM theories we need the equivalent
of what the principal fibre bundle formalism is doing for Healey when he discusses
classical gauge theories. This formal apparatus should fill a few requirements:
(1) Naturalistic: it should come from physics itself.
(2) Not realm specific: it should give a transparent transition from classical to
quantum YM theories.
(3) General: it should be flexible enough to treat all applications of YM theory in
quantum physics.
Let us briefly examine each of these requisites. The first is designed to comply with
methodological naturalism. The language for studying conceptual foundations of
science should come from science itself. Having said that, it is not necessary to ad-
here to naturalism to aim for a formal framework coming from science. Recent his-
tory shows many examples where technical formalisms of scientific origin enrich
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in a significant way philosophical discourse. For example, the use of geometrical
models in (Earman, 1989), of fibre bundle in (Maudlin, 2007) or of a mathematical
approach to objectivity in (Nozick, 2001). Moreover since concepts like gauge and
field are heavily theory laden, a scientific formal framework may be better able to
represent them.
The second requisite would allow discussing in the same framework interpretations
of classical and quantum YM theories. Ideally we want our philosophy of classical
and quantum physics not to be completely separate. Some difficulties seem specific
to quantum physics, like renormalization and anomalies, but a discussion of the
variables of a gauge reduced classical theory could inform the interpretation of the
associated quantum YM theory. If the passage from a classical gauge theory to its
quantized version is transparent enough it is a clear advantage.
Finally, a good technical formalism must be general enough to the discussion of
many theories in a similar way. For example a technical framework that would
only be able to represent well U(1) YM theory and not non-Abelian YM theories
would be interesting but could in fact mislead us. As a requisite the chosen technical
formalism should be able to represent all YM theories but also be a good framework
to examine more specific features like the vacuum, renormalization and anomalies.
I believe two formal apparatuses fill all these requirements: Dirac quantization
(DQ) based on the representation of a YM classical theory as a constrained Hamil-
tonian 2 and Feynman functional sum over histories quantization (FQ) which starts
with a Lagrangian representation of the classical YM theory. Both formalisms come
from physics itself. Both formalisms express the transition from classical to quan-
tum theory in a relatively clear manner. Schematically, DQ is an extension of canon-
ical quantization techniques. In the classical theory the gauge transformations cor-
respond to first-class Hamiltonian constraints. During the quantization process the
first-class constraints are promoted to operators on a Hilbert space that can identify
vectors in the physical sector. In FQ the quantization process consists in produc-
ing a functional sum over possible classical histories of the studied system. Each
history contributes through its associated action to a probability amplitude. I will
return to this shortly. Finally, both formalisms are general in two senses. First, they
can accommodate all YM theories and provide a representational framework to dis-
cuss more specific questions, like the status of the vacuum. Second, they can serve
as formal language to formulate an interpretation of quantized gauge theories. In
their actual form, these formalisms are far more than simple quantization tools. Un-
fortunately, you would not notice this reading Healey’s book. Since the landmark
publications of (Dirac, 1950) and (Feynman, 1948), these formalisms became so-
phisticated apparatuses able to frame in an interesting way most of our questions
about YM theories. See for example (Henneaux & Teitelboim, 1992) or (DeWitt,
2 Healey uses the constrained Hamiltonian formalism to argue effectively certain points
but he does not do it in a systematical way.
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2003).
It is not the place here to discuss in depth all questions that can be clarified by
adopting one or the other of these formalisms. For examples about the use of DQ
I refer the reader to (Earman, 2003) and (Pons, 2005). As for FQ, since this for-
malism is almost absent from philosophical literature I will briefly present two
examples where FQ can help to clarify some aspects of quantum YM theories. As a
first example let us discuss briefly the status of holonomies in quantum YM theory.
Healey pushes strongly for a holonomy interpretation of classical YM theories. He
also maintains that the holonomy concept is essential to understand the AB effect
because this phenomenon can be model as a U(1) principal fibre bundle. The FQ
formalism can help to defend this point and generalize it. In the context of non-
relativistic quantum mechanics the transition probability amplitude of a system, let
us say of one charged particle, is computed by summing the phase contributions of
all possible trajectories (histories). If we add electromagnetism to the picture we
can note that the relative change of phase between two paths, caused only by elec-
tromagnetic interaction, is exactly equal to the holonomy computed for a closed
curve formed by the two already mentioned paths, with the electromagnetic po-
tential playing the role of the connection. In other words, since in FQ a quantum
phenomenon is the result of the interference between contributions of different his-
tories, holonomy is the relevant entity to qualify in general electromagnetic inter-
action in semi-classical contexts.
The way to extend this reasoning to a fully quantized YM theory with matter fields
is not obvious. However, if we limit ourselves to models built on a lattice, Wilson
(1974) has shown that the gauge interaction can be characterized in significant con-
texts by the trace of what, in a geometrical setting, would be called holonomies.
In consequence holonomies are not just a nice tool to characterize classical gauge
properties but also are a fundamental mathematical entity to characterize gauge in-
teraction in non-relativistic quantum physics and in certain models of quantum field
theory on a lattice.
The second example is more technical. To quantize a non-Abelian YM theory is a
tricky business. First, we have to get under control the gauge surplus. If we just fix
the gauge the obtained quantized theory is not unitary. As explained by Healey (p.
167) one of the convenient ways to quantize a non-Abelian YM theory is to add to
the gauge fixed Lagrangian terms involving new fields, called ghosts, that guarantee
unitarity and renormalizability. 3 Physicists consider these fields fictive. Using the
FQ formalism, Bryce DeWitt proposes a proof that shows that this quantized theory
(with gauge fixing and ghost terms) is equivalent to an eventual quantization of a
3 This procedure is equivalent to imposing a new global symmetry, called the BRST sym-
metry, to the YM theory (Becchi et al., 1976). The role of this symmetry in classical YM
theory is discussed in (Catren, 2008).
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gauge reduced theory. 4 In other words the added degrees of liberty coming from
the ghost fields are just what is needed to neutralize the effect in the quantum theory
of the added degrees of liberty coming from the gauge surplus. To my knowledge
such a proof exists only in the FQ. The implications of this proof for the status of
the gauge principle, as a pragmatic principle, are discussed in (Guay, 2008).
Even if this Carnap style approach is appealing, an important question remains
about the compatibility of these two frameworks. If it is proven that they do not
produce compatible quantum theories, starting with the same classical theory, a
choice will have to be made. But in the mean time both should be exploited in a
systematic way by philosophers.
4 Conclusion
In spite of the few already mentioned weaknesses, the reading of Gauging What’s
Real is very stimulating. Since the measure of any book is the questions it makes
us ask, Healey’s work is exemplary. The diversity of problems and approaches dis-
cussed in the book will undeniably provoke responses and comments from many
readers. Is this not what a philosophy book should do?
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